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Timeliness, Equity, and Federal Appellate 
Jurisdiction: Reclaiming the "Unique 
Circumstances" Doctrine 
Philip A. Pucillo· 
A federal court of appeals ordinarily has no authonty to enteJtain an appeal that is filed 
out of time. On occasion, however, the untimeliness of an appeal w1ll result not fivm the 
appellants carelessness or lack of familianty with goveming timing prescriptions, but instead 
fivm reasonable reliance upon a district courts representation that the appeal penOd would be 
lengthier than it tumed out to be. To provide the courts of appeals with an equitable basis upon 
which to reach the ments of such an appeal, the Umted States Supreme Court recognized what 
has come to be known as the "umque cirr:umstances" doctrine. 
The Supreme Courts most recent pronouncements on the umque cirr:umstances doctrine, 
however, have narrowed it almost completely out of existence. Even belbre abolishing the 
doctrine lbr appeals livm ciwl actions, the Court generated significant confUsion by imposing 
conditions lbr the doctrines application that were both unduly demanding and inconsistent with 
Jts original understanding. The courts of appeals have thus been deprived of discretion to reach 
the ments of many appeals that would have fallen within the purVJew of the doctrine as 
onginally conceived. 
This Article urges that Congress reclaim legislatively the essence of the unique 
circumstances doctrine that the Supreme Court implemented judicially in Harris. Such a 
measure would involve an amendment to§ 2107 codifYing a formulation of the doctnne that 
comports with its onginal understanding. To den·ve that lbnnulation, this Article examines 
Harris and the Courts other key decisions addressing the doctrine. The lbnnulation ultimately 
reached is that in determining whether an appeal is timely, a court of appeals is bound to accept 
as tnJe any representation of a district court upon which a litigant reasonably re!Jes in lbregoing 
an opportunity to initiate an indisputably timely appeal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A federal court of appeals ordinarily has no authority to entertain 
an appeal that is filed out of tirne. 1 On occasion, however, the 
untimeliness of an appeal will result not from the appellant's 
carelessness or lack of familiarity with governing timing prescriptions, 
but instead from reasonable reliance upon a district court's 
representation that the appeal period would be lengthier than it turned 
out to be.2 To provide the courts of appeals with an equitable basis 
upon which to reach the merits of such an appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized what has come to be known as the "unique 
circumstances" doctrine. 3 The courts of appeals, in turn, have 
1. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2362 (2007). 
2. See, e.g., Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1964) (per curiam), overruled 
by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007); Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat 
Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 216-17 (1962) (per curiam), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 
S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
3. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 387; Hams, 371 U.S. at 217. 
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employed the doctrine to preserve numerous appeals that were 
technically untimely.4 
The Supreme Court's latest pronouncements on the unique 
circumstances doctrine, however, have narrowed it almost completely 
out of existence. Specifically, the Court recently declared that, given 
the jurisdictional nature of the timing prescriptions contained in 28 
U.S.C. § 2107, the doctrine can no longer be applied in the context in 
which it was most often implicated: an appeal as of right from a 
decision by a federal district court in a civil proceeding.5 Even before 
that decision, the Court had significantly restricted the scope of the 
doctrine by suggesting that it applied only when the appellant 
"performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the 
deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a 
judicial officer that this act has been properly done.'>6 Ironically, as a 
consequence of either of these rulings, the doctrine no longer 
encompasses the circumstances giving rise to Hams Truck Lines, Inc. 
v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., the very case in which the Court initially 
recognized and invoked the doctrine.7 The courts of appeals have thus 
been deprived of discretion to reach the merits of many appeals that 
would have fallen within the purview of the doctrine as originally 
conceived. 
This Article urges that Congress reclaim legislatively the essence 
of the unique circumstances doctrine that the Supreme Court had 
implemented judicially in Harris. Such a measure would involve an 
amendment to § 2107 codifying a formulation of the doctrine that 
comports with its original understanding. To derive that formulation, 
this Article examines Hams and the Court's other key decisions 
addressing the doctrine. The formulation ultimately reached is that in 
determining whether an appeal is timely, a court of appeals is bound to 
accept as true any representation of a district court upon which a 
litigant reasonably relies in foregoing an opportunity to initiate an 
indisputably timely appeal. This quasi-estoppel approach to the 
doctrine appropriately emphasizes the notion that the timeliness of an 
appeal should not be governed by ordinarily applicable timing 
prescriptions when the appellant would have complied with those 
prescriptions but for the district court's representation that more time to 
appeal would be available. Instead, the court of appeals must assume 
4. See inffa note 178 and accompanying text. 
5. See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366. 
6. Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989). 
7. 371U.S.at217. 
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the truth of the district court's representation, even if legally erroneous, 
and assess the timeliness of the appeal accordingly. 
Part II of the Article provides an overview of the timing 
requirements governing an appeal from a district court's decision in a 
civil proceeding that a court of appeals has jurisdiction to review as a 
matter of right. Part III then conducts a comprehensive examination of 
Harri~and the Supreme Court's other cases through which the 
doctrine has evolved in order to derive an appropriate formulation of 
the doctrine-while demonstrating the confusion and inconsistency 
generated in the courts of appeals by the Court's most recent 
formulation. Part IV discusses how the Court determined, in 
retrospect, that the doctrine never should have applied to appeals as of 
right from decisions in civil proceedings. Finally, in Part V, the Article 
proposes that the original understanding of the unique circumstances 
doctrine be codified through an amendment to § 2107 in order to 
restore the capacity of the courts of appeals to reach the merits of 
technically untimely appeals when equitable considerations would so 
demand. 
II. INITIATING A TIMELY APPEAL AS OF RIGHT IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS8 
The appropriate method of commencing a proceeding in a federal 
court of appeals depends upon both the nature of the decision to be 
appealed and the tribunal that rendered ie Because the unique 
circumstances doctrine is most often implicated when a litigant in a 
civil proceeding challenges a decision of a federal district court10 that is 
8. This Part draws from a similar discussion contained in a previous publication. 
See Philip A. Pucillo, Rescuing Rule 3(c) fivm the 800-Pound Gorilla: The Case fOr a No-
Nonsense Approach to Defective Notices of Appeal, 59 OKLA. L. REv. 271, 273-77 (2006). 
9. See generally FED. R. APP. P. 4 (discussing an appeal from a judgment or order 
from a district court); id R. 6 (discussing appeals in bankruptcy cases from a final judgment, 
order, or decree from either a district court or a bankruptcy appellate panel); 1d R. 13 
(discussing an appeal from a decision of the United States Tax Court); id R. 15 (discussing 
an appeal of an order of an administrative agency, board, commission, or officer); id R. 22 
(discussing the procedure for applying for a writ of habeas corpus); Pucillo, supra note 8, at 
273 (explaining that the process of taking an appeal is dependent upon "the nature of the 
decision to be challenged"). 
I 0. Although the courts of appeals have invoked the unique circumstances doctrine 
most frequently in regard to action by federal district judges and federal district clerks, they 
have also invoked the doctrine (or at least examined whether to do so) in regard to action by 
bankruptcy judges. See Home & Family, Inc. v. Eng. Res. Corp. (In re Home & Family, Inc.), 
85 F.3d 478, 479-81 (lOth Cir. 1996); Weston v. Mann (JiJ re Weston), 18 F.3d 860, 863 (lOth 
Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Mouradick (In re Mouradick), 13 F. 3d 326, 329 (9th Cir. 1994); Ford 
v. Union Bank (In re San Joaquin Roast Beef), 7 F.3d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1993); Allred v. 
Kennerley (In re Kennerley), 995 F.2d 145, 147-48 (9th Cir. 1993); Slimick v. Silva (JiJ re 
Slimick), 928 F.2d 304, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1990); Headlee v. Ferrous Fin. Servs. (JiJ re Estate of 
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appealable as a matter of right,' 1 this Article focuses on that particular 
context. 
A. The Timing Requirements of a Notice of Appeal in a Civil 
Proceeding 
Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that 
an appeal as of right from a decision of a federal district court may be 
initiated "only by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within 
the time allowed by Rule 4."12 Rule 4(a)(l), in turn, sets forth the 
timing requirements applicable to the filing of a notice of appeal in a 
civil proceeding. 13 Under Rule 4(a)(l)(A), a litigant ordinarily has 
thirty days from the district court's entry of a judgment or ordd4 in 
Butler's Tire & Battery Co.), 592 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 1979). The doctrine has also 
been used to examine action by magistrate judges, see Schneider ex rel Estate of Schneider v. 
Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 403-04 (3d Cir. 2003); Green v. Bisby, 869 F.2d 1070, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 
1989); Fairley v. Jones, 824 F.2d 440, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1987); and immigration judges, see 
Hernandez-Rivera v. INS, 630 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1980); as well as agencies such as 
the National Labor Relations Board, see Long Island Radio Co. v. NLRB, 841 F.2d 474, 478-
79 (2d Cir. 1988); and the Merit Systems Protection Board, see Oja v. Dep 't of the Army, 405 
F.3d 1349, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
II. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (granting appellate jurisdiction over "appeals 
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States"); id. § 1292(a)(l) (granting 
appellate jurisdiction over "appeals from ... [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the 
United States . . . or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifYing, refusing or 
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modifY injunctions"). When a decision may 
be appealed only with the permission of the court of appeals, see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) 
("A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court 
granting or denying class action certification .... "(emphasis added)), the appellant must file 
with that court a petition for permission to appeal. See id. R. S(a)(l) ("To request permission 
to appeal when an appeal is within the court of appeals' discretion, a party must file a petition 
for permission to appeal."). 
12. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(l)(emphasis added). 
13. !d. R. 4(a)(l). 
14. Under Rule 4(a)(7) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a judgment or 
order is "entered" within the meaning of Rule 4(a): 
(i) if Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(l) does not require a separate 
document, when the judgment or order is entered in the civil docket under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a); or 
(ii) if Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(l) requires a separate document, 
when the judgment or order is entered in the civil docket under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 79(a) and when the earlier of these events occurs: 
I d. R. 4( a )(7). 
the judgment or order is set forth on a separate document, or 
!50 days have run from entry of the judgment or order in the civil 
docket under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a). 
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which to file a notice of appeal. 15 However, Rule 4(a)(l)(B) affords a 
litigant sixty days in which to file the notice when the United States, or 
an officer or agency of the United States, is a party to the underlying 
action. 16 
Notably, Rule 4(a)(l)'s thirty-day and sixty-day timmg 
restrictions have statutory counterparts in the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2107. 17 Indeed, the thirty-day limit imposed by Rule 4(a)(l)(A) is an 
exact reflection of§ 2107(a), which provides in relevant part that "no 
appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, swt or 
proceeding of a ciVJl nature before a court of appeals for review unless 
notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such 
judgment, order or decree." 18 Moreover, Rule 4(a)(1)(13)'s allowance 
for sixty days when the United States is a party to the underlying 
proceeding simply mirrors the same allowance contained in 
§ 2107(b). 19 
15. Jd R. 4(a)(1 )(A) ("In a civil case ... the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must 
be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is 
entered."). 
16. ld R. 4(a)(l)(B) ("When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the 
notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order 
appealed from is entered."). 
1 7. Section 21 07 provides in relevant part: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any 
judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature 
before a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within 
thirty days after the entry of such judgment, order or decree. 
(b) In any such action, suit or proceeding in which the United States or an 
officer or agency thereof is a party, the time as to all parties shall be sixty 
days from such entry. 
(c) The district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the 
expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for 
appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. In addition, if 
the district court finds-
(!) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did 
not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of 
its entry, and 
(2) that no party would be prejudiced, the district court may, upon motion 
filed within 180 days after entry of the judgment or order or within 7 
days after receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time 
for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order 
reopening the time for appeal. 
28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(c) (2000). 
18. Id § 2107(a) (emphasis added). 
19. ld § 2107(b) ("In any such action, suit or proceeding in which the United States 
or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the time as to all parties shall be sixty days from 
such entry."). 
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B. Addressing an Expired Appeal Penod· Extension and Reopemng 
When the pertinent appeal period has expired, a federal court of 
appeals has no authority to afford a litigant additional time in which to 
file a notice of appeal. 20 The relevant provision is Rule 26(b )( 1) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states that "the court may 
not extend the time to file ... a notice of appeal (except as authonied 
In Rule 4) ."21 And under Rule 4(a), a district court alone may extend 
the time to file a notice of appeal, and only under limited 
circumstances. 22 
First, Rule 4(a)(5) authorizes a district court to grant an extension 
of time to file a notice of appeal.23 The litigant seeking the extension 
must move "no later than 30 days after the time prescribed by ... Rule 
4(a) expires"24 and demonstrate "excusable neglect" or "good cause" 
for the extension.25 If granted, the extension may not exceed "30 days 
after the prescribed time or 10 days after the date when the order 
granting the motion is entered, whichever is later."26 
Second, under Rule 4(a)(6),27 a district court may reopen the time 
to file a notice of appeal when a litigant seeks to appeal from a 
20. See FED. R. APP. P. 26(b)(l); see also Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 
(2007) (finding that filing a timely notice of appeal is a requirement to confer jurisdiction 
upon a court of appeals in a civil proceeding). 
21. FED. R. APP. P. 26(b)(l) (emphasis added). 
22. See id R. 4(a)(6); see also Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2363 (discussing Rule 4(a)'s 
relevant provisions, which allow a district court to reopen or extend the time to file a notice of 
appeal). 
23. Rule 4(a)(5) provides in full: 
(A) The district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if: 
(i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after the time prescribed by this 
Rule 4(a) expires; and 
(ii) regardless of whether its motion is filed before or during the 30 days 
after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires, that party shows 
excusable neglect or good cause. 
(B) A motion filed before the expiration of the time prescribed in Rule 4(a)(l) 
or (3) may be ex parte unless the court requires otherwise. If the motion is 
filed after the expiration of the prescribed time, notice must be given to the 
other parties in accordance with local rules. 
(C) No extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days after the 
prescribed time or 10 days after the date when the order granting the motion 
is entered, whichever is later. 
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5). 
24. Id R. 4(a)(5)(A)(i). 
25. Id R. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). For an interesting discussion of the "excusable neglect" 
standard, see Graphic Commc'ns Int'l Union, Local 12 N v. Quebecor Pnnting Providence, 
Inc., 270 F. 3d 1, 4-7 (1st Cir. 2001 ). 
26. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(C). 
27. Rule 4(a)(6) provides in full: 
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judgment or order of which it did not receive timely notice under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d).28 To qualify for such relief, the 
litigant must file the appropriate motion within 180 days after entry of 
the judgment or order to be appealed, or within seven days after 
receiving notice of the judgment or order under Ru1e 77(d), whichever 
is earlier.29 The litigant then must demonstrate that he did not receive 
notice of the judgment or order under Rule 77(d) within twenty-one 
days of entry by the district court.3° Finally, the district court must find 
that a reopening of the appeal period would not prejudice any of the 
parties.31 Upon granting the motion, "[t]he district court may reopen 
the time to file [a notice of] appeal for a period of 14 days after the 
date when its order to reopen is entered."32 
Like Rule 4(a)'s thirty-day and sixty-day requirements, the 
preceding standards applicable to a litigant's effort to obtain an 
extension or a reopening of the time to appeal have counterparts in 
§ 2107. Specifically,§ 2107(c) provides that "[t]he district court may, 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a 
showing of excusable neglect or good cause."33 That same section also 
authorizes a district court to reopen the time to appeal for a fourteen-
day period "upon motion filed within 180 days after entry of the 
judgment or order or within 7 days after receipt of such notice, 
whichever is earlier," as long as the court determines "(1) that a party 
entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive 
The district court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 
days after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only if all the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
(A) the court finds that the moving party did not receive notice under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 77( d) of the entry of the judgment or order sought 
to be appealed within 21 days after entry; 
(B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or 
within 7 days after the moving party receives notice . . . of the entry, 
whichever is earlier; and 
(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced. 
Jd R. 4(a)(6). 
28. Rule 77( d) provides in pertinent part: "Immediately upon the entry of an order or 
judgment the clerk shall serve a notice of the entry in the manner provided for in Rule 5(b) 
upon each party who is not in default for failure to appear, and shall make a note in the 
docket of the service." FED. R. Crv. P. 77(d). 
29. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6)(B). 
30. Jd R. 4(a)(6)(A). 
31. Jd R. 4(a)(6)(C). 
32. Id R. 4(a)(6). 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000). 
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such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and 
(2) that no party would be prejudiced."34 
C. The Unique Circwnstances Doctnne 
A third means of seeking relief from an expired appeal period, 
unlike extension or reopening of time to appeal, has no basis in any 
statute or procedural rule.35 Rather, this avenue resulted from the 
Supreme Court's effort to provide the courts of appeals with an 
equitable basis upon which to reach the merits of an appeal that, 
although technically untimely, should nonetheless be treated as timely 
because the appellant reasonably relied upon a district court's 
representation that the appeal period would be lengthier than it turned 
out to be.36 This approach thus requires not that the appeal period be 
extended or reopened, but that the timeliness of the appeal is assessed 
in a manner that accounts for the appellant's reasonable reliance.37 
The Supreme Court's recognition and development of this 
approach, which has come to be known as the unique circumstances 
doctrine, is examined in Part III below. 
III. THE RECOGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIQUE 
CIRCUMSTANCES DOCTRINE 
A. The Recognition of the Doctrine in Harris 
The Supreme Court's initial recognition of the "unique 
circumstances" doctrine occurred almost forty-five years ago in Harn"s 
Tmck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Jnc.38 Harris arose from the 
efforts of Harris Truck Lines, Inc. (Harris) to recover unpaid freight 
charges from Cherry Meat Packers, Inc. (Cherry), a shipper.39 After 
the district court dismissed Harris's complaint and entered judgment in 
favor of Cherry on its counterclaim, Harris's attorney sought to confer 
with the company's general counsel about whether to bring an appeal.40 
Unable to reach the general counsel, who was then vacationing abroad, 
34. Id § 2107(c)(l)-(2). 
35. Cf. MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND 
PRACTICE§ 6.03, at 343-44 (3d ed. 1999) (describing the "unique circumstances" doctrine as 
"another escape hatch from a fmding of untimeliness"). 
36. See Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1964) (per curiam), overruled by 
Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
37. Seeid 
38. 371 U.S. 215 (1962) (per curiam), overruledby Bowles, 127 S. Ct. 2360. 
39. Id at 215. 
40. Idat2!6. 
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Harris's attorney moved in the district court for an extension of time in 
which to file a notice of appeal.41 Significantly, the motion was filed 
within the initial thirty-day appeal period, 42 rather than after its 
expiration.43 The district court eventually granted the motion and 
afforded Harris an additional two weeks of time to appeal.44 
Although Harris filed a notice of appeal within the time as 
extended by the district court, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
because the appeal was filed untimely.45 In so ruling, the court was 
satisfied that Harris was not entitled to an extension of time to appeal 
because it had failed to demonstrate the requisite '"excusable neglect 
based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment."o46 
The court reasoned that "[n]either the motion for extension nor any of 
the assertions made at the hearing ... support a finding or conclusion 
that [Harris] was unaware of the entry of the judgment or of the order," 
and thus the district court had no basis upon which to grant the 
extension.47 The court concluded, therefore, that Harris's notice of 
appeal was filed out oftime.48 
In vacating the Seventh Circuit's judgment, the Supreme Court 
expressed empathy for a litigant in Harris's position by noting "the 
41. Id 
42. Under then-Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a litigant 
ordinarily had thirty days from the entry of a judgment or order in which to file a notice of 
appeal. FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a), repnnted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1964), abrogated by FED. R. APP. P. 
4(a), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V 1969). A period of sixty days would apply instead 
if the United States, or an agency of the United States, were a party to the action. Id 
These same timing prescriptions are now contained in Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
43. SeeHarris,371 U.S.at216. 
44. Id 
45. Id 
46. Id at 217 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1964), 
abrogated by FED. R. APP. P. 4(a), reprinted In 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V 1969)). At that time, 
Civil Rule 73(a) authorized a district court to extend the appeal period upon a showing of 
"excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment." FED. 
R. Civ. P. 73(a), repnnted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1964), abrogated by FED. R. APP. P. 4(a), repnnted 
in 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V 1969). Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
subsequently absorbed the relevant provisions of Civil Rule 73(a). See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) 
advisory committee's note ("This subdivision is derived from FRCP 73(a) without any 
change of substance."). Presently, Rule 4(a) authorizes a district court to extend the appeal 
period upon a generalized showing of either "excusable neglect" or "good cause." See id R. 
4(a)(5)(A)(ii). 
47. Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 303 F.2d 609, 611-12 (7th 
Cir. 1962), vacated, 371 U.S. 215 (1962) (per curiam), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. 
Ct. 2360 (2007). 
48. Id 
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obvious great hardship to a party who relies upon the trial judge's 
finding of 'excusable neglect' prior to the expiration of the 30-day 
period and then suffers reversal of the finding."49 Resolving that such a 
finding was entitled to "great deference" by a court of appeals, the 
Court held that "[ w ]hatever the proper result as an initial matter on the 
facts here, the record contains a showing of umque circumstances 
sufficient that the Court of Appeals ought not to have disturbed the 
motion judge's ruling."50 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to 
the Seventh Circuit for consideration of the appeal on the merits.51 
Considering the Harris Court's rather cursory explanation of its 
determination that the Seventh Circuit improperly invalidated the 
extension that Harris had secured from the district court, it is difficult 
to pin down the exact proposition that informed the Court's decision. 
One plausible explanation is that the Court meant to say nothing more 
than that, in the narrow context of a motion to extend the time to file a 
notice of appeal before the relevant time period has expired, a district 
court's finding of excusable neglect is not reviewable by a court of 
appeals. After all, the mere possibility that a court of appeals would 
overrule an excusable neglect finding would compel a prudent litigant 
to file a notice of appeal dunng the appeal period rather than trust in 
the validity of the ensuing extension. But if a litigant is so compelled 
to initiate an appeal before the appeal period has expired, the exercise 
of seeking an extension of that period would be pointless. 
However, one could also plausibly construe the Hams Court's 
discussion as endorsing a principle of estoppel that would apply well 
beyond the specific context of the case.52 As noted earlier, the district 
court in Harris could not have extended Harris's time to appeal absent 
a determination that Harris had committed "excusable neglect based 
on [its] failure ... to learn of the entry of the judgment."53 The district 
court's granting of the extension thus carried with it a representation, 
albeit an implicit one, that Harris had made the requisite showing. 
Notwithstanding the apparent lack of a basis for such a 
49. Harris,37I U.S.at217. 
50. Id (emphasis added). 
51. Id 
52. See I JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 6.06[6], at 6-56 
(3d ed. 2007) (describing the unique circumstances doctrine as "an equitable theory similar to 
estoppel"); 4B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1168, at 572 (3d ed. 2002) ("[T]he unique circumstances concept is based on a 
theory very similar to estoppel."). 
53. Hams, 371 U.S. at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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representation,54 the Supreme Court forbade the Seventh Circuit from 
questioning that representation because Harris had reasonably relied 
upon it in deciding to initiate an appeal only after the initial thirty-day 
appeal period had lapsed. 55 Accordingly, the Hams Court's point may 
have been that, in determining whether an appeal is timely, a court of 
appeals is bound to accept as true any representation of a district court 
upon which an appellant reasonably relies in foregoing an opportunity 
to initiate an indisputably timely appeal. 56 
R The Development of the Doctrine in Thompson andWolfsohn 
Of the two readings of Hams discussed above, the Court 
emphatically rejected the narrow reading in a pair of cases that came 
before it several years later. 57 
1. Thompson v. INS 
Thompson v. INS involved the effort of Willard Thompson, a 
Canadian, to become a citizen of the United States by way of a petition 
for naturalization.58 After the district court denied the petition 
following trial, Thompson sought to challenge that disposition by 
filing several motions, including a motion for a new trial under Rule 
59 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.59 Although Thompson was 
required to serve the motion within ten days of the entry of the 
judgment,60 he did not do so until twelve days thereafter.61 
Two subsequent events of significance led Thompson to conclude 
that the motions at issue were timely despite having been served 
beyond ten days of the entry of the judgment. First, in opposing the 
motions, the government presented no timeliness objection to them.62 
54. See supra text accompanying note 4 7. 
55. Harris,371 U.S.at217. 
56. See 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 52, § 1168, at 572-73 ("The Supreme 
Court seems to have concluded that a party ought not be denied an opportunity to secure 
appellate review because of her failure to file a timely appeal when that failure resulted from 
reliance on action taken by the district court that generated a reasonable belief that the 
appellate process could be initiated at a later date."). 
57. See Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (per curiam), overruled by Bowles v. 
Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007); Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203 (1964) (per curiam). 
58. 375 U.S. at 384. 
59. Id at 385. 
60. See FED. R. Crv. P. 59(b), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1994) ("A motion for a new 
trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment."). 
61. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 385. 
62. Id 
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Second, and more significantly, the district court specifically declared 
that Thompson brought his motion for a new trial "in ample time.'o63 
Thompson's belief as to the timeliness of the motions had 
significant ramifications for the case. In particular, a timely Rule 59 
motion would have delayed the running of the sixty-day appeal period 
applicable to the underlying denial of his petition64 until the district 
court disposed of that motion.65 Indeed, a notice of appeal filed while 
such a motion was pending would have amounted to a nullity.66 
Presumably familiar with these timing regulations, Thompson waited 
until the district court disposed of his motions, and only then filed, 
within sixty days, a notice of appeal from the underlying denial of his 
petition.67 
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit dismissed Thompson's appeal 
as untimely.68 In so ruling, the court was satisfied that Thompson had 
not filed his postjudgment motions in a timely fashion.69 
Consequently, the initial sixty-day appeal period continued to run 
despite the filing of his motions, and elapsed long before he had filed a 
notice of appeal from the underlying denial of his petition. 70 
In vacating the Seventh Circuit's judgment, the Supreme Court 
invoked the unique circumstances doctrine that it had recognized two 
years earlier in Hams. 71 The Court was receptive to Thompson's 
explanation that had the timeliness of his postjudgment motions been 
questioned at the time that he had submitted them, he "could have, and 
63. /d (internal quotation marks omitted). 
64. The appeal period was sixty days because an agency of the United States was a 
party to the action. See FED. R. C!v. P. 73(a), repnnted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1964), abrogated by 
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a), repnnted In 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V 1969). 
65. See id ("The running of the time for appeal is terminated by a tilne.(ymotion [for 
a new trial under Rule 59] . . . and the full time for appeal fixed in this subdivision 
commences to run and is to be computed from the entry of any [order] ... denying [that] 
motion." (emphasis added)). 
66. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 180-81 (1962). Under the current framework, 
a notice of appeal filed prior to the disposition of a timely Rule 59 motion is simply held in 
abeyance until the disposition of that motion (and any related postjudgment motions). FED. 
R.APP. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). 
67. See Thompson, 375 U.S. at 385 (noting that the district court denied Thompson's 
motions on October 16 and showing that he then filed a notice of appeal from the underlying 
denial of his petition on December 6). 
68. Id 
69. SeeThompson v. INS, 318 F.2d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 1963), vacated, 375 U.S. 384 
(1964), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
70. See id at 682 (noting that the district court entered its denial of Thompson's 
petition on April 18 and, accordingly, his notice of appeal from this judgment should have 
been filed by June 16, but was not filed until December 6). 
71. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 387. 
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presumably would have, filed the appeal within 60 days of the entry of 
the original judgment, rather than waiting, as he did, until after the trial 
.court had disposed of the post-trial motions."72 The Court then drew 
the following comparison of the circumstances of Thompson's case to 
those in Hanis. 
Here, as there, petitioner did an act which, if properly done, postponed 
the deadline for the filing of his appeal. Here, as there, the District 
Court concluded that the act had been properly done. Here, as there, 
the petitioner relied on the statement of the District Court and filed the 
appeal within the assumedly new deadline but beyond the old deadline. 
And here, as there, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District 
Court had erred and dismissed the appeal. 73 
Satisfied that Thompson's case fit "squarely within the letter and spirit 
of Hards," the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for 
consideration of the merits ofThompson's appeal.74 
The Thompson Court's analysis confirmed that the scope of the 
unique circumstances doctrine extended well beyond the narrow 
context of a litigant who relies upon a district court's mistaken (albeit 
implicit) finding of excusable neglect and, as a result, files his appeal 
outside the required thirty-day time period. 75 At the same time, 
however, the Court's comparison of the case to Hanis, specifically its 
observation that Harris and Thompson each "did an act which, if 
properly done, postponed the deadline for the filing of his appeal," 
suffers from two serious flaws. 76 First, the comparison suggests that 
the unique circumstances doctrine applies only to an appellant who did 
something improper in the district court. However, while Thompson's 
act of bringing a Rule 59 motion beyond the applicable ten-day limit 
would qualify as improper, Harris did nothing of the sort.77 Indeed, 
Harris's only act of significance was to seek an extension of time to 
appeal at a point when he could have filed a timely notice of appeal.78 
Second, the Thompson Court's comparison of the cases suggests that 
the unique circumstances doctrine applies only to an appellant whose 
improper act in the district court, if properly done, would have 
72. /d at 386. 
73. /d at 387. 
74. ld 
75. See4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 52,§ 1168, at 572 (observing that "[t]he 
Harris Truck Lines principle was extended" in Thompson). 
76. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 387 (emphasis added). 
77. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
78. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43. 
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"postponed the deadline for the filing of [an] appeal."79 But while 
Thompson's act of bringing a timely Rule 59 motion certainly would 
have postponed the time in which he had to appeal from the underlying 
denial of his petition, the same cannot be said regarding Harris's act of 
bringing a motion to extend the time to appeal.80 At best, Harris's 
motion would have resulted in an order granting the sought extension, 
in which case the district court's act of issuing the order, not Harris's 
act of filing the motion, would have effected the postponement of the 
appeal deadline.8 ' 
Notwithstanding its flawed comparison, the Thompson Court was 
correct in concluding that the case before it fit "squarely within the 
letter and spirit of Hanis."82 Indeed, the Court's disposition in both 
cases comports with the principle that a court of appeals is bound to 
accept as true a representation of the district court upon which a 
litigant reasonably relies in foregoing an opportunity to initiate the 
filing of a timely notice of appeal.83 In the same manner that Harris 
had reasonably relied upon the district court's implicit representation 
that it had made the excusable neglect showing necessary to obtain an 
extension of the time to appeal,84 Thompson had reasonably relied 
upon the district court's explicit representation that he had filed his 
motion for a new trial in time.85 It was, therefore, incumbent upon the 
Seventh Circuit to view Thompson's motion as having been timely 
filed, and thus having the effect of delaying the running of the sixty-
day appeal period until the disposition of that motion.86 Had the 
Seventh Circuit done so, it would have determined that the notice of 
appeal filed by Thompson, which he filed within sixty days of the 
denial of his motion, was timely.87 The court could then have 
proceeded to the merits of Thompson's appeal from the underlying 
denial of his petition. 
79. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 387. 
80. See FED. R. Clv. P. 73(a), repnnted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1964), abrogated by FED. R. 
APP. P. 4(a), repnnted 1n 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V 1969). 
81. See28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5). 
82. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 387. 
83. See discussion supra Part liLA. 
84. See Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 217 
(1962) (per curiam), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
85. See Thompson, 375 U.S. at 387. 
86. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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2. Wolfsohn v. Hankin 
The Supreme Court affirmed its approach in Thompson just one 
month later through a summary disposition in Wolfsohn v. Hankin. 88 
In Wolfsohn, Rebecca Wolfsohn, like Thompson, sought to challenge 
an adverse judgment by way of a motion for a new trial under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59.89 Before filing that motion, however, she 
secured from the district court an extension of time in which to do so.90 
Although Wolfsohn filed her Rule 59 motion within the time as 
extended by the district court,91 it turned out that the district court had 
no authority to grant the extension in the first place in light of Rule 
6(b ).92 
The regrettable effect of the invalidity of the district court's 
extension was that Wolfsohn's Rule 59 motion was untimely.93 
Consequently, the initial thirty-day appeal period continued to run 
while her motion was pending before the district court.94 Presumably 
believing that her motion was timely as a result of the extension, 
Wolfsohn waited until the district court denied the motion and only 
then filed, within thirty days, a notice of appeal from the underlying 
judgmene5 Because the time to appeal from the underlying judgment 
had elapsed by that point, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia dismissed Wolfsohn's appeal as untimely.96 
88. 376 U.S. 203 (1964) (per curiam). 
89. Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 321 F.2d 393, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam), revli, 376 
U.S. 203 (1964) (per curiam). Although Wolfsohn styled her motion as one for "rehearing," 
the court of appeals construed it as a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59. Id 
90. Id 
91. Id 
92. See id; FED. R. Clv. P. 6(b), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1964) (providing that a 
district court may not enlarge the time to file a Rule 59 motion). The current version of Rule 
6(b) contains this same restriction. See FED. R. CIY. P. 6(b ). 
93. Wolfsohn was required to have served the motion within ten days after the district 
court entered its judgment. See Wolfsohn, 321 F.2d at 394 (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 59(b), 
reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1994) (amended 1995)). In light of the extension, however, she 
did not do so until thirty-five days thereafter. Id 
94. See id As observed earlier, only a timely Rule 59 motion would delay the 
running of the period in which to appeal from the underlying judgment until after disposition 
of that motion. See FED. R. Clv. P. 73(a), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1964), abrogated by 
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a), repnnted In 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V 1969). 
95. See Wolfsohn, 321 F.2d at 394 (noting that the district court denied the motion on 
October 12, and Wolfsohn filed her notice of appeal, based on these duties within thirty days, 
on November 3). 
96. Id The district court entered judgment on May 7, which meant that any notice of 
appeal from that decision was required to be filed within thirty days, by June 5. Wolfsohn, 
however, did not file her notice of appeal until November 3. Id 
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On Wolfsohn's petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court 
summarily reversed the D.C. Circuit's judgment, offering no rationale 
other than citations to Hanis and Thompson. 97 In so doing, the Court 
insinuated that the D.C. Circuit should have reached the merits of 
Wolfsohn's appeal by invoking the unique circumstances doctrine as 
developed in those cases. Such an approach would undoubtedly have 
been consistent with a formulation of the doctrine derived from the 
Thompson Court's comparison of Thompson and Hanis.98 
Specifically, Wolfsohn's filing of an untimely motion for a new trial 
under Rule 59 was an act that, "if properly done," would have 
postponed the deadline for the filing of her appeal.99 Moreover, having 
extended the time in which Wolfsohn could bring her motion, 100 the 
district court essentially expressed its conclusion that the eventual 
filing of that motion "had been properly done."101 And, of course, 
Wolfsohn's reliance upon the district court's conclusion was reflected 
in her decision to delay the initiation of her appeal from the underlying 
judgment until after the district court disposed of her motion. 102 
Applying the Thompson Court's formulation, therefore, the D.C. 
Circuit was obligated to entertain Wolfsohn's appeal on the merits. 
As explained above, however, the preceding approach to the 
unique circumstances doctrine simply cannot be reconciled with 
Hams. 103 But the Court's disposition in Wolfsohn can nonetheless be 
reconciled with Hanis and Thompson. Indeed, like its dispositions in 
Hams and Thompson, the Court's disposition in Wolfsohn comports 
with the principle that a court of appeals, in determining the timeliness 
of an appeal, must accept as true a representation of the district court 
upon which a litigant reasonably relies in foregoing the opportunity to 
file a timely notice of appeal. 104 
The application of this principle to Wolfsohn bears a remarkable 
similarity to its application in Thompson. 105 Even though the district 
court in Wolfsohn lacked the authority to extend the time in which 
97. Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203, 203 (1964) (per curiam). 
98. See Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 387 (1964) (per curiam), overruled by 
Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
99. Seeid 
100. Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 321 F.2d 393, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam), rev'd, 376 
U.S. 203 (1964) (per curiam). 
101. Thompson, 375 U.S. at 387. 
102. See Wolfsohn, 321 F.2d at 394. 
103. See supm text accompanying notes 76-81. 
104. See discussion supm Part II.C. 
I 05. See supm text accompanying notes 82-87. 
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Wolfsohn could bring a Rule 59 motion, 106 the district court's act of 
granting that extension carried with it the implicit representation that 
any motion filed within the extension would be timely.107 Because 
Wolfsohn reasonably relied upon that representation in delaying the 
initiation of her appeal from the underlying judgment until after the 
district court disposed of her motion, the D.C. Circuit was required to 
view that motion as having been timely filed and thus having the effect 
of delaying the running of the thirty-day appeal period until the district 
court disposed of that motion.108 Had the D.C. Circuit followed that 
approach, it would have found that Wolfsohn's notice of appeal, which 
she filed within thirty days of the denial of the motion, was timely. 109 
The court could then have proceeded to the merits of Wolfsohn's 
appeal from the underlying judgment. 
C A Narrowing of the Doctrine in Osterneck 
The trilogy of Hanis, Thompson, and Wolfsohn was noteworthy, 
not only for its recognition and development of the unique 
circumstances doctrine, but also because the Supreme Court invoked 
the doctrine to preserve the appeal at issue in each case.110 But the 
streak came to an end approximately twenty-five years later in 
Ostemeck v. Emst & Whinney''' 
Ostemeck arose from a merger involving Cavalier Bag Company, 
Inc. (Cavalier) and E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc. (Barwick). 112 
Following consummation of the merger, several members of the 
Osterneck family (the Osternecks), who were the owners of Cavalier 
106. See Woi/Sohn, 321 F.2d at 394. Similarly, the district court in Harris had no 
authority to extend the time to file a notice of appeal absent a showing of "excusable neglect 
based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of judgment" under then-Civil Rule 73(a). 
FED. R. Clv. P. 73(a), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1964), abrogated by FED. R. APP. P. 4(a), 
repnnted in 28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V 1969). 
I 07. See Woi/Sohn, 321 F.2d at 394; see also Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat 
Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 216-17 (1962) (per curiam) (implying that because notice of 
appeal was filed within the extension period granted by the district court, the court of appeals 
should hear the merits of the appeal), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
I 08. See FED. R. Clv. P. 73(a), repnnted 1n 28 U.S.C. app. (1964), abrogated by FED. R. 
APP. P. 4(a), reprinted 1n 28 U.S. C. app. (Supp. V 1969). 
I 09. See Wo//Sohn, 321 F.2d at 394 (noting that the district court denied the motion on 
October 12, and she filed her notice of appeal within thirty days, on November 3). 
110. See Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203, 203 (1964) (per curiam); Thompson v. 
INS, 375 U.S. 384, 387 (1964) (per curiam), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 
(2007);Hams,371 U.S.at217. 
Ill. 489 U.S. 169 (1989). 
112. Ostemeck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1523 (lith Cir. 1987), 
aff(f sub nom. Ostemeck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989). 
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before it was merged into Barwick, suspected that Barwick had 
fraudulently misrepresented its financial condition for the two years 
preceding the merger in order to secure the Ostemecks' approval. 113 
The Ostemecks eventually brought suit against Barwick and several 
other defendants. 114 
In January 1985, the district court entered a judgment in the 
Ostemecks' favor with respect to several, but not all, of the 
defendants. 115 The Ostemecks subsequently brought a timely motion 
for discretionary prejudgment interest, which the district court granted 
in July 1985. 116 During the six-month interim between the filing of the 
motion and its disposition, several of the parties (including the 
Ostemecks) filed notices of appeal and/or cross-appeal with regard to 
the January 1985 judgment.117 As it turned out, however, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the 
Ostemecks' motion for discretionary prejudgment interest constituted 
a motion to alter or amend the judgment for purposes of Rule 59, 118 
and accordingly dismissed each of the appeals and cross-appeals 
initiated by the parties prior to the district court's disposition of that 
motion. 119 
In an effort to convince the Eleventh Circuit that their premature 
appeal from the January 1985 judgment should not be dismissed, the 
Ostemecks urged that the court invoke the unique circumstances 
doctrine. 120 They reasoned that certain rulings and actions of both the 
district court and the Eleventh Circuit had led them to believe that the 
January 1985 judgment was indeed appealable upon its entry. 121 In 
113. Id 
114. Id at 1523-24. 
115. Id at 1524. 
116. Id 
117. Id 
118. Id at 1525. The Supreme Court affirmed this conclusion on direct appeal from 
the Eleventh Circuit's judgment. Ostemeck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989). 
119. See Ostemeck, 825 F.2d at 1525. At that time, Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure provided that a notice of appeal had no effect if filed while a Rule 59 
motion was pending. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4), repnnted in28 U.S.C. app. (1988) (amended 
1993) ("If a timely motion ... is filed in the district court by any party ... under Rule 59 ... 
the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order ... granting or denying 
... such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of [a Rule 59 motion] shall 
have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured 
from the entry of the order disposing of the motion .... "). 
Under the present framework, a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a timely 
Rule 59 motion is simply held in abeyance until that motion (and any related postjudgment 
motions) are decided. Jd R. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). 
120. Ostemeck, 825 F.2d at 1527. 
121. Seek/. 
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particular, the Ostemecks cited the district court's rulings granting one 
defendant's bill of costs, denying Bruwick's motion for an extension of 
time to file its bill of costs, and denying another defendant's motion to 
stay execution of the judgment. 122 They also made reference to the 
district clerk's requirement that they pay an additional filing fee in 
connection with the cross-appeal that they brought only after the 
district court entered an amended judgment in July 1985.123 Finally, 
they contended that they reasonably relied upon the Eleventh Circuit's 
failure to advise them that its jurisdiction over their appeal was in 
question. 124 
The Eleventh Circuit's determination that the situation fell 
beyond the purview of the unique circumstances doctrine125 was 
ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court on direct appeal. 126 Yet, the 
Court could have reached that same determination and maintained 
consistency with the trilogy of Hanis, Thompson, and Wolfsohn by 
applying the formulation of the doctrine offered above, specifically, 
that a court of appeals, in determining the timeliness of an appeal, 
must accept as true a representation of the district court upon which a 
litigant reasonably relies in delaying the filing of a notice of appeal. 127 
Indeed, none of the referenced actions of the district court or the 
Eleventh Circuit even arguably constituted representations that would 
have caused the Ostemecks to delay the filing of a notice of appeal 
until the pertinent appeal period had lapsed. 128 If anything, the 
Ostemecks suffered the adverse consequences of filing a notice of 
appeal before the appropriate time to do so. 
Rather than employ the preceding approach to the unique 
circumstances doctrine, the Supreme Court resorted to the Thompson 
formulation, and substantially narrowed it in the process. 129 In 
particular, the Court stated that the doctrine "applies only where a 
122. /d 
123. Id The Osternecks argued that this requirement suggested that the district clerk 
did not treat their motion for discretionary prejudgment interest as a Rule 59 motion. Id 
Specifically, they argued that, under Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
no additional filing fee would have been required for a second notice of appeal filed after the 
disposition of a Rule 59 motion. Id 
124. Id 
125. Id at 1528. 
126. Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989). 
127. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. 
128. The Eleventh Circuit made a similar observation in emphasizing that "[a]t no 
time has the district court or this court ever affirmatively represented to the Osternecks that 
their appeal was timely filed, nor did the Osternecks ever seek such an assurance from either 
court." Ostemeck, 825 F.2d at 1528 (emphasis added). 
129. See Ostemeck, 489 U.S. at 178-79. 
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party has performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone 
the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance 
by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done."130 Having 
confined the scope of the doctrine in this manner, the Court summarily 
disposed of the Ostemecks' assertion that the doctrine should be 
applied to preserve their appeal from the January 1985 judgment 
because the Ostemecks received no specific assurance by a judicial 
officer. 131 
D A ConfiJsedApplication oftheDoctrineAfterOstemeck 
The formulation of the unique circumstances doctrine put forth 
by the Ostemeck Court was faulty in at least three respects. First, it 
retained the troubling aspects of the Thompson Court's formulation by 
suggesting that the doctrine applies solely to those appellants who 
commit an improper act that, if done properly, would have postponed 
the appeal deadline. 132 As observed above, these limitations upon the 
doctrine are unacceptable to the extent that they cannot be reconciled 
with Hams. 133 What is more, these limitations resulted in the 
incongruity that the equitable relief afforded by the doctrine was 
reserved for an appellant who commits an improper act (as opposed to 
an appellant who commits no improper act), thus ensuring that a court 
of appeals would be precluded from applying the doctrine in favor of 
those appellants who deserve it most. 
Second, the Ostemeck formulation was flawed because it limited 
the application of the unique circumstances doctrine to an appellant 
who received a specific assurance that the improper act had been 
properly done. 134 By requiring a specHJc assurance, 135 the formulation 
appears to have envisioned a statement akin to the district court's 
declaration in Thompson that Thompson's motion for a new trial was 
timely.136 No such specificity, however, was involved in either Harris 
or Wolfsohn. Indeed, the source of reasonable reliance for the 
appellants in those cases was a ruling of the district court extending the 
130. Id at 179. 
131. Seeid 
132. See id at 178-79 (citing Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 387 (1964) (per 
curiam), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007)). 
133. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. 
134. Ostemeck, 489 U.S. at 179. 
135. /d 
136. See Thompson, 375 U.S. at 385 (noting that the trial court stated that Thompson's 
motion was made '"in ample time"'). 
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time to file a notice of appeal, 137 and a ruling of the district court 
extending the time to file a motion for a new trial, 138 respectively. At 
the very least, it is questionable whether a district court's mere act of 
entering either type of decision would rise to the level of a specific 
assurance of anything, let alone that some act of the appellant had been 
properly done. 
The third flaw in the Ostemeck Court's formulation was that, in 
order for the unique circumstances doctrine to apply, the requisite 
specific assurance had to be rendered by a 'judicial officer."139 The 
problem with the formulation's use of the phrase 'judicial officer" is 
that it strongly suggests that only a judge possesses the authority to 
render an assurance upon which a litigant may reasonably rely. 140 The 
obvious implication is that a litigant who relies upon a representation 
provided by the clerk of the district court (or a member of the clerk's 
staff) will not receive the benefit of the doctrine. Such a limitation is 
troubling to the extent that district clerks routinely issue official 
communications to litigants on behalf of the court. Accordingly, a 
litigant who relies upon such a communication in foregoing an 
opportunity to file a timely notice of appeal will be acting no less 
reasonably than a litigant who relies upon an explicit statement from a 
district judge. 
Not surprisingly, these defects in the Ostemeck formulation 
produced a haphazard application of the unique circumstances doctrine 
in the courts of appeals. In particular, those courts were left to choose 
between applying the Ostemeck formulation and applying the more 
generous conception of reasonable reliance upon which the Supreme 
Court originally based the unique circumstances doctrine. The 
confusion that ensued with regard to three recurring situations 
implicating the doctrine is discussed below. 
1. An Appellant's Reliance upon an Unauthorized Extension or 
Reopening ofTime To File a Notice of Appeal 
One recurring situation implicating the unique circumstances 
doctrine involves an appellant who, in reliance upon a district court's 
137. See Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 216 
(1962) (per curiam), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
138. See Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 321 F.2d 393, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (per curiam), revi:f, 
376 U.S. 203, 203 (1964) (per curiam). 
139. See Ostemeck, 489 U.S. at 179. 
140. As noted earlier, various courts of appeals have determined that the ')udge" in 
question need not be a district judge, but may also be a magistrate judge, a bankruptcy judge, 
or an immigration judge. See supra note I 0 and accompanying text. 
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unauthorized extension or reopening of the time to file an appeal from 
a judgment or order, passes over an opportunity to file what would 
have been an indisputably timely appeal from that judgment or order. 141 
As observed earlier, a district court may extend the appeal period if the 
party seeking the extension demonstrates "good cause" or "excusable 
neglect."142 In addition, when a party does not receive notice of a 
judgment or order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d), the 
district court may reopen the time to appeal from that judgment or 
order upon satisfaction of certain conditions. 143 
Prior to Ostemeck, if a district court exceeded its authority in 
extending or reopening an appeal period, the courts of appeals would 
ordinarily reach the merits of an ensuing appeal under the unique 
circumstances doctrine. 144 Such action was justified on the basis that 
the appellant reasonably relied upon the district court's action in 
foregoing the opportunity to initiate a timely appeal when the 
opportunity presented itself. Indeed, this approach is perfectly 
consistent with Hanis, which involved nothing more than an 
appellant's reliance upon a district court's extension of time to appeal 
that by all appearances was not authorized by the standard of 
"excusable neglect" in effect at the time. 145 
After Ostemeck, however, the courts of appeals were less inclined 
to invoke the unique circumstances doctrine in order to preserve such 
an appeal/46 as illustrated by the disposition of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Bowles v. Russelr7 In Bowles, 
Keith Bowles moved for a reopening of the appeal period after he 
failed to receive Rule 77( d) notice of the district court's denial of his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpuS. 148 The district court granted the 
motion but erroneously reopened the appeal period for several days in 
excess of the fourteen-day limitation set forth in Rule 4(a)(6) of the 
141. See, e.g., Harris, 371 U.S. at 216. 
142. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). 
143. See id R. 4(a)(6). 
144. See, e.g., United Artists Corp. v. La Cage Aux Folies, Inc., 771 F.2d 1265, 1267-
70 (9th Cir. 1985), abrogated byMt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441 (9th 
Cir. 1992); Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 182-83 (7th Cir. 1984); Nat'! 
Indus., Inc. v. Republic Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 677 F.2d 1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 1982). 
145. SeesupmPart liLA. 
146. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668, 673-76 (6th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 127 S. 
Ct. 2360 (2007); United States v. Dumont, 936 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1991 ); Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Evans, 896 F.2d 1255, 1257-58 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
147. 432 F.3d at 673-77. 
148. Jd at 670. 
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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 149 Bowles then filed his notice 
of appeal from the judgment within the time as extended by the district 
court but outside of the fourteen days allowed under the rule. 150 
The Sixth Circuit ultimately dismissed Bowles' appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction because of his untimely notice of appeal. 151 In so doing, 
the court refused to invoke the unique circumstances doctrine, citing 
four separate reasons why the situation fell outside of the Ostemeck 
formulation. 152 First, the court determined that Bowles' act of moving 
to reopen the appeal period "did not attempt to postpone [the] deadline 
for filing his appeal."153 Second, the court observed that, although the 
district court committed an improper act by reopening the appeal 
period for a lengthier period of time than the rules allowed, Bowles 
committed no improper act of his own. 154 Third, operating under the 
premise that the Ostemeck formulation required "that judicial 
assurances follow the actions of the party," the court noted that the 
assurance in the matter at hand preceded Bowles' act of moving for a 
reopening of the appeal period. 155 And fourth, the court was satisfied 
that Bowles "received no assurances from the district court that his 
notice of appeal was timely."156 
Even assuming that the Bowles court's application of the 
Ostemeck formulation was correct, its refusal to preserve the appeal at 
issue cannot be reconciled with the unique circumstances doctrine as 
originally understood. Indeed, fidelity to the original conception 
would require that the Ostemeck formulation be disregarded altogether 
in determining whether to invoke the doctrine in the face of an appeal 
initiated pursuant to an unauthorized extension or reopening of an 
appeal period, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit did in the post-Ostemeck matter of Estle v. Country Mutual 
Insurance Co. 157 
149. ld; see28 U.S. C. § 2107(c)(2000); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6). 
150. Bowles, 432 F. 3d at 670-71. 
151. /dat675-77. 
152. Id at 675-76. The Ostemeck formulation confines the unique circwnstances 
doctrine to situations "where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would 
postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial 
officer that this act has been properly done." Ostemeck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 
179 (1989). 
153. Bowles, 432 F.3d at 675. 
154. Id ("[I]t was, in fact, the district court here that performed the improper act and 
purported to extend the filing date beyond what was permitted by the Rule."). 
155. ld 
156. Id 
157. 970 F.2d 476 (8th Cir. 1992). 
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Estle arose from Sondra Estle's effort to recover insurance 
benefits from Country Mutual Insurance Co. (Country). 158 After the 
district court entered judgment in favor of Country, Estle brought a 
motion for reconsideration. 159 On the following day, Estle moved to 
have the time to appeal from the judgment extended for thirty days 
following the disposition of the motion for reconsideration. 160 
Notwithstanding that Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure authorized the district court to extend the appeal period for 
n~ longer than thirty days after the prescribed time/61 the court 
mistakenly extended the appeal period as Estle had requested. 162 
As it turned out, Estle filed her notice of appeal within thirty days 
of the denial of her motion for reconsideration, but beyond the thirty 
days of the prescribed time. 163 Thus Country challenged the appeal on 
timeliness grounds. 164 While acknowledging that Estle's appeal was 
initiated beyond the time allowed by the rules, the Eighth Circuit 
invoked the unique circumstances doctrine in order to preserve the 
appeal. 165 Relying upon Hards, and omitting any mention of 
Ostemeck, the court stated that "[ u ]nder these unique circumstances, 
we conclude that the notice of appeal was timely."166 
The Eighth Circuit's disposition in Estle, unlike the Sixth Circuit's 
disposition in Bowles, fits perfectly within the original conception of 
the unique circumstances doctrine. Consistent with Harris and the 
other cases in which the Supreme Court developed the doctrine, a 
circuit court's assessment of the timeliness of an appeal must consider 
whether the appellant reasonably relied upon a representation of the 
district court in foregoing an opportunity to file an indisputably timely 
appeal. 167 Accordingly, even though a district court lacks the authority 
to extend or reopen the time to appeal beyond that allowed by the 
pertinent timing prescriptions, the district court's act of granting an 
extension or reopening for a particular period of time carries with it the 
implicit representation that an appeal initiated within that period would 
!58. Jd at 477. 
159. Jd 
160. /dat477-78. 
161. Id at 478; see FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5). In light of a restyling, this restriction is 
presently set forth in subsection (C) of Rule 4(a)(5). 
162. See Estle, 970 F.2d at 478. 
163. Seeid 
164. Id at 477. 
165. Jd at 478. 
166. Jd 
167. See supm Part III.A. 
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be timely. 168 If an appellant relies upon that representation in delaying 
the filing of a notice of appeal until after the permissible time, the 
court of appeals is then bound to accept the district court's 
representation as true, which would compel the conclusion that the 
notice was filed in a timely fashion. 169 The court could then proceed to 
the merits of the appeal from the decision at hand. 
2. An Appellant's Reliance upon an Unauthorized Extension of 
Time To File a Rule 59 (or Related) Motion 
A second recurring situation implicating the unique 
circumstances doctrine is exemplified by the situation that gave rise to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Wolfsohn. 170 That is, an appellant 
relies upon a district court's extension of time to file a postjudgment 
motion under Rule 59, or a related postjudgment motion that, if timely 
filed, would delay the running of time to appeal from the underlying 
judgment,171 in deciding to delay initiating an appeal from the 
underlying judgment. 172 Because such an extension is unauthorized in 
light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b ), 173 however, the appellant 
will end up filing that motion outside of the applicable ten-day 
restriction. 174 The time to file a notice of appeal from the underlying 
judgment will thus continue to run while the motion is pending before 
the district court. 175 In the meantime, the appellant will wait for that 
disposition prior to filing a notice of appeal, operating under the belief 
168. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56. 
170. See supra Part III.B.2. 
171. Rule 4(a)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure delineates the six 
categories of motions that have this effect: 
(i) for judgment under Rule 50(b); 
(ii) to amend or make additional factual findings under Rule 52(b), whether or 
not granting the motion would alter the judgment; 
(iii) for attorney's fees under Rule 54 if the district court extends the time to 
appeal under Rule 58; 
(iv) to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59; 
(v) for a new trial under Rule 59; or 
(vi) for relief under Rule 60 if the motion is filed no later than 10 days after the 
judgment is entered. 
FED. R. APP. P. (4)(a)(4)(A). 
172. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b). As it did when Wolfsohn was decided, Civil Rule 6(b) 
presently prohibits a district court from extending the time to file a motion for a new trial 
under Rule 59, among other motions. Id 
174. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. 
1 7 5. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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that the time to appeal from the underlying judgment will commence 
only after the district court disposes of the motion. 176 But by the time 
that the district court disposes of the motion, the time to appeal from 
the underlying judgment will have elapsed, and thus the ensuing notice 
of appeal from that judgment will be untimely.' 77 
Consistent with the Supreme Court's disposition in Wolfsohn, the 
usual pre-Ostemeckapproach employed by the courts of appeals when 
confronted with this scenario was to preserve the appeal at issue by 
invoking the unique circumstances doctrine. 178 Armed with the 
Ostemeck Court's narrow formulation of the doctrine, however, most 
176. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
178. See, e.g., Fairley v. Jones, 824 F.2d 440, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1987); Butler v. Coral 
Volkswagen, Inc., 804 F.2d 612, 615-18 (lith Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Inglese v. Warden, 
U.S. Penitentiary, 687 F.2d 362, 362-63 (lith Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Stauber v. Kieser, 810 
F.2d I, 1-2 (lOth Cir. 1982) (per curiam), overruled by Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 
214 F. 3d 1175 (I Oth Cir. 2000); Fairway Ctr. Corp. v. U.I.P. Corp., 491 F.2d 1092, 1093-94 
(8th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). 
Interestingly, several courts of appeals have gone so far as to invoke the unique 
circumstances doctrine to preserve an appeal from an underlying judgment even when the 
district court had not granted an extension of time to file the postjudgment motion at issue, 
holding that the district court's mere act of considering the motion and ultimately 
adjudicating it on the merits was sufficient to induce reasonable reliance on the part of the 
appellant. See, e.g., St. Marys Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (7th Cir. 
1985); Webb v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 696 F.2d 101, 105-06 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1967); Pierre v. Jordan, 333 F.2d 
951, 955 (9th Cir. 1964). But more recent decisions have by and large rejected this approach. 
See, e.g., Hall v. CIA, 437 F.3d 94, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. 
Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1462-63 (9th Cir. 1992); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 159-61 (3d 
Cir. 1988); Ctr. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. NRC, 781 F.2d 935, 941-43 (D.C. Cir. 
1986); Marane, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 755 F.2d 106, Ill n.2 (7th Cir. 1985); Gribble v. 
Harris, 625 F.2d 1173, 1174-75 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Flint v. Howard, 464 F.2d I 084, 
1086-87 (I st Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
In cases involving a district court's actual extension of time to file a postjudgment 
motion, the courts of appeals have often refused to invoke the unique circumstances doctrine 
to preserve an appeal initiated after disposition of the motion because the appellant had no 
claim of reasonable reliance upon the extension under the specific circumstances of the case. 
For example, an appellant cannot claim reliance upon an unauthorized extension of time to 
file a motion if, at the time of the extension, the time in which to file a notice of appeal from 
the underlying judgment had already elapsed. See, e.g., Talano v. Nw. Med. Faculty Found., 
Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2001); Feinstein v. Moses, 951 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1991); 
Fiester v. Turner, 783 F.2d 1474, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986). 
A different scenario arose when a district court, rather than simply granting an extension 
to file a postjudgment motion, granted permission to file that motion out of time. See, e.g., 
Panhorst v. United States, 241 F.3d 367, 371-73 (4th Cir. 2001); Arnold v. Wood, 238 F.3d 
992, 997 (8th Cir. 2001). The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth 
Circuits have held that, because only a time.(ymotion could postpone the time to appeal from 
the underlying judgment, see FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A), the appellant could not reasonably 
rely upon the extension because it was understood that the motion was untimely. See 
Panhorst, 241 F.3d at 371-73; Arnold, 238 F.3d at 997. 
720 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:693 
courts of appeals refused to invoke the doctrine to preserve an appeal 
initiated under the same circumstances. 179 
This latter approach was exemplified by the disposition of the 
Sixth Circuit in Rhoden v. Campbell 180 In that matter, Lawtis Rhoden 
responded to an adverse judgment by seeking a fifteen-day extension 
in which to file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
59( e ). 181 Notwithstanding its lack of authority to extend the time to file 
such a motion, 182 the district court granted the extension. 183 Rhoden 
then filed his motion within the time as extended by the district court, 
but beyond the ten-day limit imposed by Rule 59. 184 Presumably 
believing that the time to appeal from the underlying judgment was not 
running as a consequence of his motion, 185 Rhoden waited until the 
district court denied the motion, and only then filed, within thirty days, 
a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment.186 By then, however, 
the time to file a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment had 
expired. 187 
179. See, e.g., Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 439 F.3d 1236, 1241 (lOth Cir. 
2006); United States ex rel McAllan v. City ofNewYork, 248 F.3d 48,53-54 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(per curiam); Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 214 F.3d 1175, 1179-81 (1Oth Cir. 2000); 
Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Group, Inc., 204 F.3d 397, 402-04 (2d Cir. 2000); Rhoden v. 
Campbell, 153 F.3d 773, 774 (6th Cir. 1998); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 116 F.3d 53, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1997); Pinion v. Dow Chern., U.S.A., 928 F.2d 1522, 1526-
35 (11th Cir. 1991); Hable v. Pairolero, 915 F.2d 394, 394-95 (8th Cir. 1990); Varhol v. Nat'l 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1561-64 (7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). But see, e.g., 
Charles v. Barnhart, 375 F.3d 777, 781-82 (8th Cir. 2004); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 
F.2d 583, 585-86 (9th Cir. 1993); United Steelworkers v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 
406 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990). 
The Seventh Circuit has emphasized that an extension of time to file a postjudgment 
motion cannot constitute a "specific assurance" if granted in the form of a minute order. See, 
e.g., Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1994); Green v. Bisby, 869 F.2d 
1070, 1072 (7th Cir. 1989), cited in Feinstein, 951 F.2d at 21. 
180. 153 F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 1998). 
181. See id. at 773. 
182. See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b) (explaining that a district court does not have 
the authority to extend the time to file a Rule 59( e) motion to alter or amend a judgment). 
183. Rhoden, 153F.3dat773. 
184. See 1d (noting that the district court entered its judgment on October 9, but 
Rhoden did not file his Rule 59(e) motion until October 31, which was, however, within the 
fifteen-day extension granted by the district court in response to Rhoden's October 17 
motion). 
185. Id. at 774 (observing that Rhoden "apparently believed that the Fed.R.Civ.P. 59( e) 
motion tolled the appeal period"). 
186. Id. at 773-74 (noting that the district court denied the motion on December 1, and 
Rhoden filed his notice of appeal on December 31, which was beyond the thirty-day limit 
prescribed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)). 
187. See id. (showing that the district court entered its judgment on October 6, but 
Rhoden did not file his notice of appeal until December 31 ). 
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The Sixth Circuit ultimately found that Rhoden's appeal was 
untimely and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.188 In so 
ruling, the court refused to preserve the appeal under the unique 
circumstances doctrine, 189 even though the situation at hand was 
virtually indistinguishable from that in Wolfsohn. 190 Indeed, rather than 
making any reference at all to Wolfsohn, the court focused entirely 
upon the formulation of the doctrine articulated in Ostemeck 191 The 
court then summarily concluded that the granting of Rhoden's request 
for an additional fifteen days in which to file his Rule 59( e) motion did 
not constitute a "specific assurance by the district court judge that the 
motion was timely filed or that it tolled the appeal period."192 
This is not to say, however, that every court of appeals rejected 
the view that a district court's unauthorized extension of time to file a 
Rule 59 motion (or a motion with similar effect) amounted to a 
specific assurance within the meaning of Ostemeck 193 In the more 
recent case of Charles v. Barnhart, the Eighth Circuit was confronted 
with an untimely appeal that plaintiff Sandra Charles initiated only 
after the district court dismissed her Rule 59( e) motion as untimely. 194 
Prior to that disposition, however, the district court had granted 
Charles's request for an extension of time to file the motion, which 
presumably led Charles to believe that her motion was timely and thus 
delayed the time to appeal from the underlying decision. 195 
The Eighth Circuit ultimately reached the merits of Charles's 
appeal by invoking the unique circumstances doctrine.196 Like the 
Sixth Circuit in Rhoden, the Eighth Circuit made no reference to 
Wolfsohn. 197 Instead, the court relied upon the Ostemeck Court's 
formulation in stating that the doctrine applies "when the district court 
specifically assures a party that its motion is timely, and the party 
188. Id at 774. 
189. Id 
190. Compare id at 773 (explaining that the appellant requested an extension of time 
in which to file a Rule 59( e) motion, which was subsequently granted by the district court), 
with Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 321 F.2d 393, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (noting that in 
response to the appellant's motion, the district court granted an extension of time in which to 
file a Rule 59(b) motion), rev(/, 376 U.S. 203 (1964) (per curiam). 
191. Rhoden, 153 F.3d at 774 (citing Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 
(1989)). 
192. Id (emphasis added). 
193. See, e.g., Charles. v. Barnhart, 375 F.3d 777,781-82 (8th Cir. 2004). 
194. /dat781. 
195. Seeid 
196. Id at 781-82. 
197. Seek/. 
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relies upon that assurance in failing to file a timely notice of appeal."198 
Given the district court's act of extending the time in which Charles 
could file a Rule 59( e) motion, the Eighth Circuit was satisfied that 
"Charles's untimely appeal falls within the narrow parameters of" the 
doctrine.199 
The failure of both the Rhoden court and the Charles court to 
even mention Wolfsohn, let alone consider it as controlling precedent, 
demonstrates the extent to which the Ostemeck formulation had 
displaced the original understanding of the unique circumstances 
doctrine in the courts of appeals. Indeed, the determination of whether 
the doctrine applied in both cases turned upon whether the district 
court's decision to extend the time to file a Rule 59 motion amounted 
to a specific assurance within the meaning of Ostemeck200 
Considering that the courts of appeals were caught up in the misguided 
search for an assurance that is "specific;' it is not surprising that they 
reached conflicting conclusions in the context of a district court's 
unauthorized extension of a Rule 59 motion. 
The courts of appeals would have achieved clarity and 
consistency in addressing this scenario by returning to the broader 
conception of reasonable reliance that served as the basis for the 
unique circumstances doctrine in general, and for the Supreme Court's 
disposition in Wolfsohn in particular.201 Even though a district court 
lacks the authority to extend the time to file a Rule 59 motion (or a 
related motion),202 its act of granting an extension carries with it the 
implicit representation that a motion would be timely if filed within 
the extended time. Should the appellant rely upon that representation 
in delaying the filing of an appeal from the underlying judgment until 
after the district court decides the motion, the court of appeals must 
then view that motion as timely, and thus as having the effect of 
delaying the running of the appeal period until the district court 
decides the motion. The appellant's notice of appeal, if filed within the 
appeal period counting from the disposition of the motion, would thus 
be determined to be timely. The court of appeals could then proceed to 
decide the merits of the appeal from the underlying judgment. 
198. Jd at 782 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Osterneck 
v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989); Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 386-87 
(1964) (per curiam)). 
199. Jd 
200. See id at 781-82; Rhoden v. Campbell, 153 F.3d 773, 774 (6th Cir. 1998). 
201. SeesupmPartiii.B.2. 
202. See FED. R. Clv. P. 6(b). 
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3. An Appellant's Reliance upon a Representation from a District 
Clerk 
A third recurring situation implicating the unique circumstances 
doctrine concerns an appellant's reliance upon a representation of the 
clerk of the district court (or a member of the clerk's staff) in foregoing 
the filing of a notice of appeal during the prescribed time.203 Not every 
court of appeals, however, has considered such reliance to be 
reasonable. Indeed, several courts of appeals have construed a 
"judicial officer," as it appeared in the Ostemeck formulation, as 
meaning a judge and only ajudge.204 
The Sixth Circuit employed this approach in dismissing the 
appeal at issue in Lawrence v. Intemational Brotherhood of 
Teamsters. 205 In that case, Carl Lawrence sought to appeal from an 
adverse judgment by way of a notice of appeal filed two days in excess 
of the thirty-day appeal period.206 Despite the untimeliness of the 
appeal, Lawrence urged that the court preserve it under the unique 
circumstances doctrine because personnel in the district clerk's office 
had confirmed that the appeal would be timely if filed on April 13, 
2001, the date on which it was indeed filed. 207 
The Sixth Circuit rejected Lawrence's contention, holding that the 
phrase "judicial officer" within the meaning of the Ostemeck 
formulation was limited to a judge.208 The court reasoned that such a 
limitation "makes sense because 'a formal order or ruling (1) generates 
the highest level of justifiable reliance, and (2) raises virtually no 
possibility of evidentiary problems for appellate courts faced with 
applying the exception."'209 Notably, however, the court could have 
promoted these same important policy concerns simply by confining 
''judicial officer" to court personnel who render official communica-
tions to litigants, thereby excluding members of the clerk's staff whose 
contact with litigants is merely informal.210 
203. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 320 F. 3d 590, 593-94 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
204. See, e.g., id; United States v. Heller, 957 F.2d 26, 29 (I st Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 
The Seventh Circuit had so limited the unique circumstances doctrine even before Ostemeck. 
See Sonicraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 385, 387 (7th Cir. 1987). 
205. 320 F.3d at 593-94. 
206. See id at 592. 
207. Seeid 
208. Jd at 593-94. 
209. Jd at 594 (quoting Moore v. S.C. Labor Bd., 100 F.3d 162, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(per curiam)). 
210. See Moore, !00 F.3d at 164 ("This case does not quality for application of the 
unique circumstances doctrine because although the statements made by the clerk's office 
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The most troubling aspect of the Sixth Circuit's approach in 
Lawrence was that it excluded from the scope of the unique 
circumstances doctrine a variety of situations in which an appellant's 
reliance would be reasonable even though a judge was not responsible 
for the erroneous representation in question. The Eleventh Circuit was 
presented with such a situation in Hollins v. Department of 
Corrections, which arose from a petition for federal habeas corpus 
relief that Wilbert Hollins filed in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida.m That court, as do many federal 
courts, offered litigants remote access to docket information through 
the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system.212 
Using PACER, Hollins's counsel regularly monitored the docket for 
any activity regarding Hollins' petition.213 Despite his monitoring, 
however, Hollins' counsel never learned that the district court had 
actually denied the petition in July 1997 because the electronic docket 
available to PACER users failed to reflect the disposition.214 Moreover, 
neither Hollins nor his counsel received a mailed copy of the order.215 
It was not until October 1998, more than fourteen months later, that 
Hollins' counsel finally learned of the district court's decision during a 
conversation with a member of the court's staff.216 By then, the time in 
which Hollins was required to file a notice of appeal from the decision 
h d . d 217 a exprre . 
Although Hollins' notice of appeal was filed well out of time, the 
Eleventh Circuit determined that "Hollins' officially invited reliance 
on the PACER system's version of the docket" constituted the type of 
situation that falls within the unique circumstances doctrine.218 In so 
ruling, the court found that the failure of personnel in the district 
clerk's office to enter the denial of Hollins' petition on the electronic 
staff may constitute specific assurances, they cannot fairly be characterized as oRYcia/judicial 
action." (emphasis added)). To support the classification of communications with or from 
clerk staff as informal or unofficial in character, see Rezzonico v. H & R Block, Inc., 182 
F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) ("With regard to the oral communication with the clerk's office, 
such statements by a member of the clerk's office staff are not official judicial assurances that 
qualify as unique circumstances."). 
211. 191 FJd 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 1999). 
212. Id 
213. Id 
214. Id 
215. Seeid 
216. Id 
217. Id 
218. Idat 1325-26. 
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docket available to PACER users constituted a specific assurance by a 
judicial officer within the meaning of Ostemeck219 
The court further determined that it was reasonable for Hollins' 
counsel to rely upon the entries in the electronic docket available to 
PACER users, considering that the district court had invited such 
reliance by stating on its internet home page that PACER provided 
access to "official electronic case information and court dockets."220 
The court was satisfied that the district clerk's failure to enter the 
denial ofHollins' petition on the electronic docket, combined with the 
district court's officially invited reliance on the PACER system, "led 
Hollins' counsel reasonably to believe the district court had not yet 
issued a final order in the case."221 The case thus presented unique 
circumstances requiring an exercise of the court's equitable power to 
proceed to the merits of Hollins' untimely appeal. 222 
Of course, the preceding disposition could not have occurred if 
Hollins had initiated his appeal in the Sixth Circuit. In light of that 
court's established take on the phrase 'judicial officer" as used in 
Ostemeck, it would have dismissed the appeal forthwith solely on the 
basis that the reliance-inducing mistake at issue was committed not by 
a judge, but by personnel in the district clerk's office.223 Accordingly, 
regardless of how reasonable it was for Hollins' counsel to rely upon 
the failure of the PACER system to reflect the denial of his client's 
petition, the situation would have fallen outside the scope of the unique 
circumstances doctrine. 
This unfortunate disparity in approaches occurred because the 
Ostemeck formulation's requirement of a judicial officer distracted the 
courts of appeals from the appropriate inquiry: whether the 
representation upon which the appellant relied was rendered by court 
personnel in the form of an official communication.224 Indeed, a 
litigant's reliance upon such a communication in foregoing an 
opportunity to initiate a timely appeal would be just as reasonable as 
reliance upon a ruling of a district judge extending the time to file a 
notice of appeal,225 an explicit statement of a district judge that a 
219. Id at 1328 (quoting Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989)). 
220. Id (internal quotations marks omitted). 
221. Id 
222. Id 
223. See Lawrence v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 320 F.3d 590, 593-94 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Rhoden v. Campbell, 153 F.3d 773, 774 (6th Cir. 1998). 
224. See supra text accompanying note 210. 
225. See dis~ussion supra Part III .A. 
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motion for a new trial had been timely filed, 226 or a ruling of a district 
judge extending the time to file a motion for a new trial. 227 
Accordingly, a court of appeals, in the manner of the Eleventh Circuit 
in Hollins, would be acting consistently with the original 
understanding of the unique circumstances doctrine by using its 
equitable power to preserve an appeal. 
IY. THE DEMISE OF THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES DOCTRINE IN CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS 
As discussed in the preceding Part, the Ostemeck formulation 
caused a great deal of confusion and inconsistency in the courts of 
appeals by significantly narrowing the scope of the unique 
circumstances doctrine.228 But the damage that Ostemeck wrought 
upon the doctrine has been overshadowed by the Supreme Court's 
recent holding that the doctrine never should have been invoked to 
preserve an appeal as of right in a civil proceeding in the first place.229 
The first serious articulation of this view in a decision of the 
Supreme Court appeared in a separate opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia in Houston v. Lack230 Although the Court's disposition in 
Houston did not implicate the unique circumstances doctrine,231 Justice 
Scalia, writing for himself and three other Justices, took the 
opportunity to challenge the underpinnings of the doctrine.232 The 
thrust of Justice Scalia's position was that the doctrine could not be 
reconciled with a jurisdictional conception of the requirements for the 
filing of a timely notice of appeal, which the Court had affirmed 
subsequent to the trilogy of Harris, Thompson, and Wolfsohn. 233 
Persuaded by Justice Scalia's analysis, many courts of appeals 
subsequently expressed skepticism concerning the viability of the 
226. See discussion supra Part III.B.l. 
227. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
228. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
229. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007). 
230. 487 U.S. 266,277-84 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
231. The Court held that the appeal at issue was.timely because the appellant, a prison 
inmate, filed his notice of appeal with prison authorities within the applicable thirty-day 
period under Rule 4(a)(l) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id at 269-70 
(majority opinion). Accordingly, the Court had no need to consider whether to invoke the 
unique circumstances doctrine in order to preserve the appeal. Id at 276 n.4. 
232. Id at 282 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
233. See 1d (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 61 
(1982) (per curiam); Browder v. Dir., Dep't ofCorr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257,264 (1978)). 
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doctrine.234 Indeed, one prominent treatise described the doctrine as 
being "at best, on life support.'ms 
The Court ultimately confirmed the merit of Justice Scalia's view 
in the recent case of Bowles v. Russell236 As previously discussed, 
Bowles involved an appellant who successfully moved to reopen the 
time to appeal.237 The district court, however, reopened the appeal 
period for seventeen days,238 even though Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), and 
its statutory counterpart in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), allow for a reopening 
of no more than fourteen days. Bowles then filed his notice of appeal 
within the time afforded by the district court, but beyond the permitted 
fourteen-day period.239 The Sixth Circuit subsequently dismissed the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on Bowles' untimely filing of his 
notice of appeal. 240 
In affirming the Sixth Circuit's judgment, the Supreme Court 
emphasized its "longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for 
taking an appeal as jurisdictional.''241 The Court observed that the 
timing restrictions relating to the reopening of an appeal, like the initial 
thirty-day period for the filing of a notice of appeal in a civil 
proceeding, are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2107.242 Because Congress has 
specifically limited the amount of time in which a district court is 
authorized to reopen the appeal period, a litigant's failure to file a 
notice of appeal within that time deprives the court of appeals of 
jurisdiction over the ensuing appeal.243 
234. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 291 F.3d 23, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Panhorst v. 
United States, 241 F.3d 367, 371-72 (4th Cir. 2001); Arnold v. Wood, 238 F.3d 992, 996-97 
(8th Cir. 2001); Anderson v. Mouradick (In re Mouradick), 13 F.3d 326, 329 n.5 (9th Cir. 
1994); United States v. HeUer, 957 F.2d 26, 28-29 (I st Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Pinion v. Dow 
Chern., U.S.A., 928 F.2d 1522, 1529 (lith Cir. 1991); Varhol v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 
909 F.2d 1557, 1561-62 (7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Kraus v. Consol. Rail Corp., 899 F.2d 
1360, 1362-64 (3d Cir. 1990). 
235. 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & 
CATHERINE T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3950.3, at 37 (3d ed. 1999 & 
Supp. 2007). 
236. 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). For critical assessments of the Supreme Court's rationale 
in Bowles, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nonjunsdictionality or Inequity, I 02 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 64 (2007); Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. PowelJ, I 02 Nw. U. L. REv. 42 
(2007); E. King Poor, The Jurisdictional Time Limit for an Appeal: The WoJ:S"t Kind of 
Deadline-Except for All OtheJ:S", I 02 Nw. U. L. REV. 151 (2008). 
237. Id at 2362. 
238. Id 
239. Id at 2362. 
240. Id at 2363. 
241. Id at 2364. 
242. Id at 2366. 
243. Seeid 
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Having confirmed that "the timely filing of a notice of appeal in 
a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement," the Court proceeded to 
declare that the application of the unique circumstances doctrine in 
such a case is illegitimate.244 In doing so, the Court highlighted that 
federal courts have no authority "to create equitable exceptions to 
jurisdictional requirements."245 The Court thus expressly overruled 
Harn"s and Thompson "to the extent they purport to authorize an 
exception to a jurisdictional rule."246 
V. RECLAIMING THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES DOCTRINE THROUGH 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
The Supreme Court's abandonment of the unique circumstances 
doctrine in civil proceedings presents a splendid opportunity for 
Congress to reclaim the essence of the doctrine in legislative form. Of 
course, given the defects in the Ostemeck formulation, a codification 
of the doctrine should capture the original understanding of the 
doctrine as developed in Harris, Thompson, and Wolfsohn. These 
cases appropriately affirm the notion that normally applicable timing 
restrictions should not control when the appellant would have 
complied with those restrictions but for a district court's erroneous 
representation that additional time to appeal would be available. 247 
Such a situation requires that the court of appeals assume the truth of 
the representation, and determine the timeliness of the appeal 
accordingly. 
Thus, § 2107 should be amended, with a corresponding 
amendment to Appellate Rule 4(a), to provide that a court of appeals, 
in determining whether an appeal is timely, must accept as true any 
representation of a district court upon which a litigant reasonably relies 
in foregoing an opportunity to initiate an indisputably timely appeal. 
For purposes of this amendment, the representations worthy of a 
reasonable reliance should include not just those of a judge, but those 
of a district clerk (or representative thereof) when rendering official 
written communications to litigants. This latter qualification, which 
would rule out oral or otherwise informal discussions between a 
244. Id 
245. Seeid 
246. Id Presumably, the unique circumstances doctrine may still be invoked with 
respect to an appeal initiated by a defendant in a criminal case, given that the timing 
requirements in question are not jurisdictional in nature. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 
U.S. 12, 13, 19 (2005) (per curiam). 
24 7. See discussion supm Part III .A-B. 
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litigant and personnel in the district clerk's office, would effectively 
eliminate the legitimate concern of evidentiary problems while 
ensuring that a litigant is not penalized for trusting the accuracy of an 
official court communication that happened to contain a clerical error 
'gh 248 or overs1 t. 
It must be emphasized that the proposed amendment to § 2107 
would constitute one more step in Congress's effort to provide equity-
rooted avenues of relief to appellants whose time to pursue an appeal 
as of right in a civil proceeding has expired. As discussed earlier, the 
statute already authorizes a district court to extend an expired appeal 
period for an appellant who can demonstrate good cause or excusable 
neglect, or to reopen an expired appeal period for an appellant who did 
not receive notice of the relevant judgment or order.249 It follows that 
the statute would also afford relief to appellants who reasonably rely 
upon representations of the district court in foregoing an opportunity 
to file a timely notice of appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court recognized the unique circumstances 
doctrine in order to equip the courts of appeals with an equitable basis 
upon which to reach the merits of an appeal that would have been filed 
in a timely fashion were it not for the appellant's reasonable reliance 
upon a district court's representation that the appeal period would be 
lengthier than it turned out to be. In such a case, the doctrine would 
permit a court of appeals to apply a quasi-estoppel approach by 
assuming the truth of the district court's representation, even if legally 
incorrect, and assess the timeliness of the appeal accordingly. 
Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court's latest pronounce-
ments on the unique circumstances doctrine have ensured that many 
litigants will undeservedly lose the opportunity to have their appeals 
adjudicated on the merits. Even before determining in Bowles that the 
doctrine, in retrospect, cannot be applied to save any appeals as of right 
in a civil proceeding, the Court in Ostemeck generated confusion and 
inconsistency by forcing the courts of appeals to confine their analysis 
to improper acts of appellants and specific assurances of judicial 
officers. As it turns out, under either Bowles or Ostemeck, the 
doctrine could not be applied to preserve an appeal initiated under the 
248. See discussion supra Part III.D.3. 
249. See28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000). 
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circumstances giving rise to Hams, in which the Court initially 
recognized and invoked the doctrine. 
It is now the responsibility of Congress to reclaim the unique 
circumstances doctrine through an amendment to § 2107 that captures 
the original understanding of the doctrine as developed in Harris, 
Thompson, and Wolfsohn. Such a provision would constitute an 
appropriate addition to a statute that contains existing avenues of relief 
from the ordinarily governing timing restrictions for the filing of a 
notice of appeal in civil cases. 
